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FORCE THROUGH A CONCERT OF 
DEMOCRACIES 
Alexander Benard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) is the 
sole international body explicitly empowered to authorize the 
use of force.  The United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter) gives 
the U.N.S.C. the responsibility to “determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace” and to “decide what measures shall be 
taken” to address that threat.1  These measures range from the 
severance of diplomatic relations to military action, which, for 
purposes of this Article, will be collectively referred to as 
“punitive measures.”  Alongside the option of presenting a 
compelling argument that its use of force constitutes self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a U.N.S.C. 
resolution presently is the only way for a country to render its 
use of force lawful under international law.2 
 It is undoubtedly valuable to have an international 
institution that serves this function.  From the U.S. point of 
view, authorization of the use of force by the U.N.S.C. has 
given the United States much-needed credibility for its 
expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, its punitive measures 
against Serbia during the Bosnia conflict, and its protection of 
                                                 
* Alexander Benard is an attorney at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & 
Hamilton LLP.  He has worked at the Department of Defense, the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the Hoover Institution.  He 
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1 U.N. Charter art. 39, para. 1. 
2 Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security 
Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 415, 422 (2007). 
      
  
 
civilian populations in Somalia, among others.  This credibility, 
in turn, has often helped American presidents gain support for 
the use of force domestically as well as from allies abroad.  
From the international point of view, meanwhile, the U.N.S.C. 
provides what is viewed by many as a check on the arbitrary use 
of force that for centuries placed weaker states entirely at the 
mercy of stronger ones.   
 The current system, however, suffers from a number of 
important deficiencies.  The conflicting priorities of the 
U.N.S.C.’s membership frequently result in gridlock, even in 
situations when action by the U.N.S.C. would clearly advance 
the interests of international peace and security—to oppose 
genocide, for example, or to prevent the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.  The U.N.S.C. also suffers from a 
democracy deficit in two respects.  First, the U.N.S.C. gives 
more power to some members than to others, affording certain 
members the power to veto U.N.S.C. resolutions.3  Second, 
some of the members of the U.N.S.C. themselves do not have 
democratic political systems, raising questions about the extent 
to which their governments can credibly speak on behalf of their 
peoples in voting for or against punitive measures in a particular 
situation. 
These shortcomings compel us to reevaluate the present 
international security architecture and to consider alternative 
institutions that might better address the threats and challenges 
of the 21st century.  This Article posits that the most appealing 
alternative institution is a Concert of Democracies, an 
organization that would consist only of countries that are 
democracies, as determined by objective criteria.4  This 
organization would be better positioned to determine when to 
authorize the use of force, because its members would agree on 
certain core values—the importance of protecting human rights, 
eliminating terrorism, and preventing the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction—and they would speak with the moral weight 
that results from being a country’s popularly elected 
representative.  A Concert of Democracies, then, would be a 
more appropriate venue through which to take collective action 
in response to modern threats.  
Part II of this Article provides background information 
about the U.N.S.C.’s role within the current international 
                                                 
3 U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
4 Other scholars have alternately referred to the Concert of 
Democracies as a League of Democracies or an Organization of Democratic 
States.   
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security architecture and describes the failure of the U.N.S.C. to 
respond to threats to international peace and security.  This Part 
also sets forth the proposals for reform of the U.N.S.C. and 
discusses why these reforms do not address the underlying flaws 
of the existing system.  Part III describes how a Concert of 
Democracies would operate and explains the advantages of a 
Concert of Democracies vis-à-vis the U.N.S.C.  Finally, Part IV 
offers ideas for how to attract support for a system in which a 
Concert of Democracies, rather than the U.N.S.C., authorizes 
the use of force.  Part IV also discusses how to establish a 
Concert of Democracies without violating existing international 
law.  
II. THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
ARCHITECTURE 
 The United Nations was founded in 1946, in the shadow 
of World War II.5  At the end of that war, the United States and 
the Soviet Union were the two preeminent powers.  France and 
Great Britain, though less powerful than the United States or the 
Soviet Union, ultimately found themselves on the winning side 
of the war, and subsequently—together with the United States 
and the Soviet Union—set about determining the structure of 
the post-war international framework, including the United 
Nations, the nascent institution around which that framework 
would coalesce.  The losing powers, on the other hand, most 
notably Germany and Japan, had virtually no say in how to 
structure the United Nations.6  
  As a result, the U.N.S.C. reflects the power dynamics 
that existed at that time.  At the outset, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and China were given 
permanent seats on the U.N.S.C., the United Nations’ most 
important and powerful organ—the only branch of the United 
Nations capable of compelling a country to take, or refrain from 
taking, a particular action.7  What is more, these permanent 
members of the U.N.S.C. were also given veto power over 
substantive decisions of the U.N.S.C., a matter of particular 
importance to the Soviet Union, which insisted on the veto 
power and advocated for the scope of that power to be as 
expansive as possible.8  In accordance with Article 27, 
decisions of the U.N.S.C. on any matters other than those that 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., STANLEY MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST FIFTY 
YEARS (1997). 
6 Id. 
7 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. 
8 MEISLER, supra note 5, at 11. 
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are purely procedural “shall be made by an affirmative vo
nine members including the concurring votes of the perman
members.”
te of 
ent 
                                                
9  Any one of the victors of World War II was 
thereby empowered to simply block a substantive decision by 
the U.N.S.C., such as the authorization of the use of force, if it 
so chose.   
A. Cold War Gridlock 
 During the Cold War, this configuration resulted in near-
constant gridlock.10  At a theoretical level, it is not difficult to 
see why this would be the case: with the United States and the 
Soviet Union increasingly taking a hostile position towards one 
another, the use of force by one of the two would inevitably be 
viewed with suspicion and skepticism by the other—and would 
be met with resistance in the U.N.S.C.  The record bore out this 
dynamic.  As one scholar put it, “unless one side was napping, 
like the Russians at the start of the Korean War, the [U.N.S.C.] 
could do very little” during the Cold War.11    
B. Post-Cold War 
 When the Cold War ended, there was widespread 
optimism that the U.N.S.C. could finally become a more 
effective body.  No longer locked in a zero-sum struggle, many 
believed the United States and Russia would agree upon what 
constituted threats to international peace and security, and the 
powers would cooperate in formulating responses to those 
threats.  As one scholar argued following the end of the Cold 
War, “the interests of the major powers in seeking to counter the 
new security threats are essentially in alignment.”12  In light of 
the fact that modern threats no longer involve direct clashes 
between the major powers, “the international security 
architecture is actually better suited to addressing these threats 
than it was to countering the conventional state-versus-state 
conflicts for which it was created.”13  These optimists 
envisioned a post-Cold War world in which the U.N.S.C. could 
at long last effectively serve its original purpose. 
 Unfortunately, that optimism has not been met with 
concrete improvements in the U.N.S.C.’s ability to tackle 
threats to international peace and security.  The U.N.S.C. failed 
 
9 U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
10 See, e.g., MEISLER, supra note 5. 
11 Id. at 35. 
12 Weiner, supra note 2, at 420. 
13 Id.  
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to authorize the use of force in response to the ethnic cleansing 
of Muslim populations in Kosovo, ultimately requiring the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to take action 
without explicit U.N.S.C. approval.14  More recently, the 
U.N.S.C. has dithered on the issue of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in Iran and North Korea, in both cases preventing the 
imposition of tough sanctions despite concerted efforts by the 
United States and its allies to do just that.15  Finally, the 
U.N.S.C. has been largely silent on the ongoing genocide in 
Sudan due to the strong opposition from China and Russia to 
punitive measures directed against the Sudanese government.16 
 1. Conflicting Interests 
 The principal reason that the U.N.S.C. has not become 
more effective since the end of the Cold War is that the interests 
of the U.N.S.C. members have not, in fact, aligned to the extent 
that some had expected.  To be sure, there is no doubt that 
China and Russia care about issues like terrorism and the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction, but they have other concerns 
that are of even greater importance to them.  For example, 
China and Russia continue to view the world through the prism 
of “spheres of influence,” and jealously guard areas within their 
sphere from perceived foreign encroachment.  This concern 
recently motivated China and Russia to advocate for the 
expulsion of U.S. troops from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
despite the fact that access to bases in both these countries has 
been critical to America’s and NATO’s efforts against al Qaeda 
in Afghanistan—efforts which manifestly benefit the entire 
international community.17  But China and Russia’s desire to 
keep the U.S. and NATO outside their sphere of influence 
trumped their interest in combating the threat of terrorism in 
Afghanistan.   
                                                 
14 See Javier Solana, NATO’s Success in Kosovo, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-
Dec. 1999.  
15  Alexander Benard & Paul Leaf, Note, Modern Threats and the 
United Nations Security Council: No Time for Complacency, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
16 Id. 
17 See Council on Foreign Relations, Russia’s Wrong Direction: What 
the United States Can and Should Do, Independent Task Force Report No. 
57 (2005), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia_TaskForce.pdf.  
See also Richard Weitz, U.S. Military Strives to Maintain Presence in 
Central Asia, CENT. ASIA-CAUCASUS INST., July 2007, available at 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4665; Council on Foreign Relations, 
Asia: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia (2005), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8440/#3. 
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China and Russia also have applied the logic of balance 
of power, often shielding governments like Iran, North Korea, 
and the Sudan from U.N.S.C. resolutions.18  China and Russia 
do this because rogue nations such as North Korea remain a 
thorn in the side of the United States and its allies by preventing 
the spread of U.S. influence in important regions like the 
Middle East and Africa.  On top of this, China and Russia have 
become economically intertwined with many of these rogue 
regimes—China is investing roughly $100 billion to develop oil 
and gas fields in Iran, and has also invested substantial amounts 
of money in the Sudanese oil industry—making them reluctant 
to authorize sanctions or other measures that could damage their 
economic interests.19  These considerations have tended to 
preclude China, Russia, and other like-minded countries from 
joining the United States and its allies in tackling issues such as 
genocide, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.    
 2. Conflicting Values 
More fundamentally, however, there is an irreconcilable 
tension between the purported goals of the U.N. Charter, on the 
one hand, and the U.N.S.C.’s structure and membership, on the 
other.  The Preamble to the U.N. Charter states that the 
organization is determined, among other things, to “reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights” and in the “equal rights of 
men and women.”20  It also articulates a determination to 
promote “social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom.”21  Elsewhere, in Article 1, the U.N. Charter goes on 
to state among its purposes the promotion and encouragement of 
“respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”22   
These goals are noble and appropriate, but it is difficult 
to see how the United Nations can effectively advance these 
goals when non-democratic countries wield a veto power in the 
U.N.S.C., and when other non-democratic countries regularly 
                                                 
18 Benard & Leaf, supra note 15. 
19 See Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil 
Industry, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2004, at A01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html. 
See also Peter S. Goodman, China Rushes to Complete $100B Deal with 
Iran, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021701117.html.  
20 U.N. Charter pmbl. 
21 Id. 
22 U.N. Charter  art. 1, para. 3.  
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hold rotating seats on the U.N.S.C.  China and Russia have little 
incentive to authorize punitive measures in response to 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other gross violations of human 
rights when China and Russia themselves are often guilty of 
engaging in human rights violations.  Indeed, China and Russia 
recognize that the very logic underlying the punitive measures 
in these situations might one day justify action in response to 
their own human rights abuses.  Two scholars recently 
summarized the point:  
. . . Russia and especially China have become 
the foremost defenders of the principle that 
states are the exclusive masters of their own 
internal affairs.  They have resisted—from 
Kosovo to Darfur to Burma—every action 
proposed by the United States and the European 
Union that would interfere in the domestic 
circumstances of other states.23 
The same applies to rotating members like Libya, Burkina Faso, 
and Uganda, all three of which currently hold seats on the 
U.N.S.C.  The composition of the U.N.S.C.’s membership, 
therefore, presents a direct and inherent impediment to 
advancing human rights and promoting international peace and 
security. 
This issue is certain to remain a source of tension in the 
years ahead.  Democracies will continue to seek authorization 
from the U.N.S.C. to take action in defense of the values 
enshrined in the U.N. Charter—values which democratic 
countries deem universal.  Non-democracies, meanwhile, will 
continue their pattern of intransigence and obstruction.  Former 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan summarized the 
dilemma as a question of whether, in these situations, 
democracies should act without U.N.S.C. authorization and 
thereby violate international law, or whether they should respect 
international law and sit idly by as atrocities occur on their 
watch.24  The more often democracies are forced to make this 
choice, the more frustrated they will grow with the present 
international security architecture. 
                                                 
23 Ivo Daalder & James Lindsay, Democracies of the World, Unite,  
AM. INT., Jan.-Feb. 2007, available at http://www.the-american-
interest.com/article.cfm?piece=220. 
24 Kofi Annan, Intervention by the UN Security Council in the Internal 
Affairs of States, UN CHRON., Fall 1998, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_3_35/ai_54259305/?tag=conte
nt;col1. 
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 C. Proposals to Reform the Existing System 
 Many have argued that reforming the existing policies 
and structure of the United Nations could address these 
deficiencies.  Reforming the United Nations is appealing 
because, among other reasons, it would avoid the controversy 
and conflict that would inevitably accompany an overhaul of the 
entire international security architecture.25  The reforms which 
have attracted the most attention are (1) adjusting the 
U.N.S.C.’s membership, (2) stripping veto power in certain 
situations, (3) imposing a “responsibility to protect”, (4) 
revising the text of Article 51, and (5) establishing a Democracy 
Caucus at the United Nations.  
 1. Security Council Reform 
For over a decade, there have been continuous calls to 
reform the membership structure of the U.N.S.C.26  The most 
frequently mentioned reform proposal is to expand the 
permanent membership of the U.N.S.C. to make the U.N.S.C. 
reflect the global distribution of power that exists today, rather 
than the distribution of power that existed in 1945.  Indeed, as 
far back as 1998, one scholar noted the following: 
Most governments, interested non-governmental 
organizations and academic observers agree that 
in the last decades the international state system 
and, more generally, conditions of international 
relations have experienced a change so profound 
that the status quo established in 1945 cannot be 
maintained without running the risk of 
relegating the [United Nations] to the backseats 
of international life.27 
                                                 
25 In evaluating the various proposals for reforming the United 
Nations, however, it is important to keep in mind that any amendment to the 
U.N. Charter requires the following: 
 (1) A vote of two third of the members of the General Assembly; 
    (2) Ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional    
    processes by two thirds of the members of the United Nations; and  
    (3) Ratification by all the permanent members of the U.N.S.C. 
U.N. Charter art. 108. 
26 See, e.g., BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 
AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998).  
27 Id. at 6. 
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That consensus has only strengthened in recent years, 
and today there is little doubt that the U.N.S.C. does in fact need 
to expand its membership to avoid alienating increasingly 
important members of the international community.  The 
discussion now centers more on the question of which countries 
should be admitted to the U.N.S.C.  Most agree that Brazil, 
Germany, India, and Japan are the top contenders for a non-veto 
holding permanent seat on the U.N.S.C.28  Other scholars have 
also suggested adding one or two African countries to ensure 
that the continent’s views are represented in important U.N.S.C. 
deliberations.29   
While U.N.S.C. expansion addresses the problem of 
preserving the U.N.S.C.’s legitimacy, it does not deal with the 
U.N.S.C.’s present inability to tackle important threats to 
international peace and security.30  Since the end of the Cold 
War, China and Russia have used their veto power to prevent 
the U.N.S.C. from taking meaningful action in response to gross 
human rights violations, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and other modern threats.31  Giving Brazil or 
Germany a permanent seat on the U.N.S.C. is necessary to 
prevent the U.N.S.C. from becoming irrelevant, but it will not 
help the U.N.S.C. grapple more effectively with modern threats, 
because it leaves untouched China and Russia’s power to veto 
any action with which they disagree.    
 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Japan, India, Germany, Brazil Push for UN Security 
Council Enlargement, VOICE AM., Jul. 7, 2005,available at 
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-07/2005-07-07-
voa1.cfm?moddate=2005-07-07 [hereinafter UN Security Council 
Enlargement]. 
29 G. John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of 
Liberty Under Law, PRINCETON PROJECT ON NATL. SEC. (2006). 
30 Some scholars have argued that expansion of the U.N.S.C. is also 
unrealistic.  See, e.g., JOHN BOLTON, SURRENDER IS NOT AN OPTION 251 
(2007): 
Unfortunately for Japan, China has no particular enthusiasm, to say 
the least, for Japan’s candidacy.  India has a claim of sorts, given its 
population size and rising economic importance, but it is bitterly opposed by 
Pakistan, which does not want its rival since birth to gain an upper hand in so 
important a body.  Brazil wants a permanent seat, as the largest country in 
the Western Hemisphere after the United States, a yearning not shared by its 
Spanish-speaking fellow Latins such as Mexico or Argentina, which have 
their own ideas about who should represent Latin America. Id.   
31 See, e.g., Robert Kagan, End of Dreams, Return of History, POL’Y 
REV., Aug.-Sept. 2007. 
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 2. Veto Power Reform 
At various points in time, different groups have argued 
in favor of abolishing the veto power on the grounds that it is at 
odds with one of the foundational principles of the United 
Nations, namely, the “equal rights . . . of nations large and 
small.”32  At a meeting of developing countries that took place 
in 1992, for example, a group representing two-thirds of the 
United Nations’ membership released a statement calling for an 
end to the veto power and arguing that the “exclusive and 
dominant” role it affords the permanent members of the 
U.N.S.C. is “contrary to the aim of democratizing the United 
Nations.”33   
The goal of eliminating altogether the veto power of the 
permanent members of the U.N.S.C. has been largely 
abandoned, given that it would be impossible to obtain the 
necessary support of the existing veto-holders.34  But a new 
version of this initiative has now been conceived.  Under this 
new version, the veto power would be eliminated only in certain 
limited contexts, for example if a country is proposing to take 
direct action in response to an acute threat.35  Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and John Ikenberry are the most prominent scholars to 
give voice to this idea, arguing the following in a recent report:  
The veto should be abolished for U.N.S.C. 
resolutions authorizing direct action in response 
to a crisis.  It makes no sense, in 2006, for five 
countries that represent the distribution of power 
at the end of World War II to have individual 
vetoes over what constitutes legitimate action.  
The current veto process does not serve the 
interests of the United States.  America does not 
need to block action of which we do not 
approve; we are almost always pushing the 
U.N.S.C. to take action rather than not, and in 
                                                 
32 U.N. Charter pmbl. 
33 UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECURITY COUNCIL, TENTH 
CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF NON-ALIGNED 
COUNTRIES, Sept. 1-6, 1992, Jakarta, THE JAKARTA MESSAGE: A CALL FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, U.N. Doc. A/47/675 (1992). 
34 See Louis Charbonneau, Nations Line Up to Slam Big Powers’ UN 
Veto Rights, PORTFOLIO, Mar. 17, 2009 (reporting that Germany’s permanent 
representative to the United Nations said the veto power was “an 
anachronism and should be abolished,” but acknowledged that hopes of 
eliminating the veto power were “unrealistic”). 
35 Ikenberry, supra note 29, at 24. 
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those cases where we are unpersuaded of the 
wisdom of a particular course, we prefer to use 
diplomacy rather than the veto.  Instead, the 
veto is a license for prevarication, 
obstructionism, and disillusionment.  The veto 
should be replaced by a supermajority vote—of 
perhaps three-quarters of voting members—in 
an enlarged Security Council.36  
This proposal has the potential to enhance the 
effectiveness of the U.N.S.C.  It would streamline decision-
making within the U.N.S.C., by making it more difficult for a 
single country to stymie collective action.  Unfortunately, 
however, the proposal remains impracticable—much like the 
original idea of abolishing the veto altogether.  Stripping the 
power to veto resolutions that authorize responses to acute 
threats would significantly dilute the power of the five current 
veto-wielding members of the U.N.S.C.  It is thus extremely 
unlikely that this reform proposal would garner the necessary 
support of the permanent members of the U.N.S.C., including 
the United States.     
 3. Responsibility to Protect 
 In a recent report commissioned by the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, a panel of experts recommended 
that all U.N. members accept the “responsibility to protect.”37  
The responsibility to protect has two main pillars: First, it 
requires that states do everything in their power to protect their 
citizens from “avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, 
ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate 
starvation and exposure to disease.”38  Second, it recognizes 
that when states are unwilling or unable to fulfill this 
requirement, the international community has an obligation to 
act in protection of those citizens—even if this means setting 
aside some traditional concerns surrounding national 
39sovereignty.  
ld 
nse 
                                                
 But it is unclear how the responsibility to protect wou
work in practice.  As previously discussed, the U.N. Charter 
allows punitive measures or the use of force only in self-defe
 
36 Id. at 25.  
37 See generally GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL (2008). 
38 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, G.A. Res. 
59/565, at 201, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
39 Id. 
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or with explicit authorization from the U.N.S.C.  In order to 
have a significant impact, then, the U.N. Charter would have to 
be amended to provide for the responsibility to protect as a thi
and separate scenario.  Few scholars, however, are proposing
the responsibility to protect as an explicit amendment to the 
U.N. Charter, and in any event such an amendment would have 
very little chance of being approved.  Rather, scholars gene
suggest that states individually accept the responsibility to 
protect as a separate obligation.  The hope, presumably, is that 
once countries have accepted the responsibility to protect, they 
will feel obligated in the U.N
rd 
 
rally 
.S.C. to vote in favor of action to 
enforce that responsibility.   
 
o 
ple, 
lly 
against the interests of many of their allies and trading 
partners. 
e 
nt on 
l 
ct 
 to 
vements in the 
decision-making of the U.N.S.C.             
 4. Article 51 Reform 
                                                
 Such a conception of how the responsibility to protect 
would work is problematic in two respects.  First, for the very 
reason that China and Russia oppose these types of enforcement
actions in the first place, both nations are extremely unlikely t
accept the responsibility to protect – especially because they 
have signaled their opposition in the past.  China, for exam
knows that human rights groups will use the logic of the 
responsibility to protect to chastise the Chinese regime for its 
treatment of Tibetans and other minorities in China.  Equa
important is the fact that China and Russia know that the 
responsibility to protect would require them to vote in the 
U.N.S.C. 
 Second, even if China and Russia do accept the 
responsibility to protect, it would be unreasonable to expect 
them to change their U.N.S.C. voting patterns accordingly.  Th
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covena
Civil and Political Rights already impose non-binding 
obligations on states in the areas of human, civil, and politica
rights.40  These non-binding obligations, however, have had 
little impact on state behavior, and appear to have had no impa
whatsoever on the behavior and voting patterns of China and 
Russia.41  Hence, there is no evidence that a responsibility
protect would result in any tangible impro
 
40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A 
(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
41 Benard & Leaf, supra note 15. 
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 At present, Article 51 imposes strict limits on a 
country’s right to resort to self-defense.  Article 51 affirms a 
country’s “inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense” in situations when an armed attack “occurs” again
member of the United Nations.
st a 
on in 
ssity that justified the use of force).   
Even under this more expansive interpretation, then, Article 51 
pose
1 
 
f 
 
cks 
 self-
 
 likelihood of an attack increases” and would, in 
the words of Yoo, move the law away from a rule and “closer to 
lem 
                                                
42  A literal reading of this 
provision would allow the exercise of self-defense only in 
circumstances where an armed attack has already occurred.  
Most, however, believe that Article 51 allows a state to take 
action in response to an imminent threat, so long as the acti
response to that threat is both necessary (i.e., the underlying 
threat is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of 
means and no moment of deliberation”) and proportional (i.e., 
the response is “not unreasonable” and kept clearly within the 
bounds of the original nece 43
im s clear constraints. 
 Several scholars have argued that the scope of Article 5
should be broadened.  These scholars point out that Article 51
presently would not allow a country to take preventive action 
against, for example, a rogue regime that is in the process o
developing weapons of mass destruction.  John Yoo has been 
one of the most vocal proponents of reforming Article 51,
arguing that innovations in technology have allowed for atta
that are “more devastating and occur with less warning,” 
presenting a potentially decisive advantage to the side that 
strikes first.44  Yoo thus believes that the current law on
defense leaves nations “ill-equipped” to handle modern threats, 
and proposes that Article 51 also take into account two 
additional factors: first, the magnitude of the harm of a possible
attack; and second, the probability that the attack will occur.45  
This approach would provide states with “greater flexibility to 
use force as the
a standard.”46 
 Yoo’s remedy, however, would not address the prob
of humanitarian interventions.  At present, one of the chief 
 
42 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
43 Daniel Webster, Letter to Henry Fox, British Minister in 
Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), in 1 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS: REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL 
PRINT pt. I, ser. C, at 153, 159 (Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt eds., 
1986).   
44 John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 742 (2004). 
45 Id. at 751. 
46 Id. at 760. 
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problems with the U.N.S.C. is the reluctance of some vet
wielding members to authorize interventions in response to 
humanitarian catastrophes such as human rights abuses, 
genocide, or ethnic cleansing.  Russia, for example, made
that it would veto the proposed use of force against Serbia in 
response to that country’s campaign against the Muslim 
populations in Kosovo.
o-
 clear 
 
 in 
nal peace and security but that often 
cannot secure the U.N.S.C. approval required to render the 
  
e 
dards 
l 
 
uld be to lessen the constraints placed 
on individual states and render those areas of international law 
o 
 
democratic members of the United Nations by spearheading a 
“Dem
                       
47  The intervention in that case by the 
United States and several European countries, however, could
not have been justified under Article 51, even under the more 
expansive definition of self-defense.  Article 51 reform thus 
leaves open the question of how to deal with this large and 
important category of interventions that most consider to be
the interests of internatio
intervention lawful.    
 Furthermore, some have argued that expanding the 
definition of self-defense as proposed by Yoo would allow 
countries to become, for all intents and purposes, their own 
arbiters on the question of the legitimacy of the use of force.48
Yoo admits that under his framework, Article 51 would becom
more of a standard than a rule.49  In domestic law, stan
pose no inherent threat to the rule of law because an impartia
third party, a court, is charged with administering that 
standard—however loose.  In international law, by contrast, 
there is no impartial third party.50  If rules are converted to 
standards in the international context—where nation-states are 
themselves tasked with applying the rules and standards to their
conduct—the impact co
virtually meaningless. 
 5. Democracy Caucus at the United Nations 
 Finally, another emergent idea is for the United States t
take a more active role in coordinating its efforts with the other
ocracy Caucus.”51  This idea developed in response to a 
                          
47 IVO DAALDER & MICHAEL O’HANLAN, WINNING UGLY: NATO’S 
WAR T 1). 
s an 
ately 
applie
ead 
O SAVE KOSOVO 26 (200
48 Weiner, supra note 2. 
49 Yoo, supra note 44. 
50 Some have argued that even in the international context, there i
impartial forum for evaluating whether standards are being appropri
d: the “court” of public opinion.  See Thomas Franck, The Use of 
Force in International Law, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7 (2003). 
51 See, e.g., Human Rights First, Democracy Caucus Urged to L
Efforts to Strengthen UN Actions on Democracy and Human Rights , Sept. 
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successful movement among developing countries to increase 
their overall power by forming a bloc that acts in concert on 
critical votes that come before the United Nations General 
Assembly.  In forming this bloc, referred to as the “Group of 
77,” developing countries have had tremendous success in 
advancing their interests.52  Democracies, perhaps, could do the 
same if they, too, banded together and voted as a bloc on certain 
critical issues. 
 Two fatal flaws prevent this proposal from having a 
significant impact.  First, democratic countries do not presently 
have the numbers necessary to form a sufficiently powerful 
voting bloc.  According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
which every year tracks the number of democracies in the 
world, only 30 countries are presently “full democracies.”53  
Another 50 countries are considered “flawed democracies.”54  A 
large proportion of those flawed democracies are developing 
countries which are also members of the Group of 77.  At best, 
their commitment to the Democracy Caucus will be 
unreliable—sometimes they will caucus with the democracies, 
but sometimes they will remain in the developing world’s camp.  
This manner of intermittent commitment by many members 
would make it impossible for the Democracy Caucus to wield 
substantial influence. 
 Second, and far more important, a Democracy Caucus 
could never affect the truly important decisions of the United 
Nations—the decisions of war and peace—since those decisions 
are made by the U.N.S.C.  Even if the Democracy Caucus were 
able to attract large numbers and enforce strict loyalty among its 
members, the veto-wielding autocracies in the U.N.S.C. could 
still block any meaningful action.  A Democracy Caucus within 
the United Nations, therefore, would fail to address the central 
flaw of the present system for authorizing the use of force.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
11, 2006, at 2, http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06912-hrd-undc-
signatures.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2009), for letters signed by over forty 
human rights and democracy leaders urging the establishment of an effective 
democracy caucus. 
52 See generally The Group of 77 Fact Sheet, http://www.g77.org (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2009). 
53 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008, 
ECONOMIST, 2008, at 2, 
http://a330.g.akamai.net/7/330/25828/20081021185552/graphics.eiu.com/PD
F/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf  (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).                                                                                 
54 Id. 
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 he 
e 
ow it 
n 
f the 1  century: a Concert of 
Democracies, an organization comprised of the world’s 
ic countries.    
ic 
 
 
ries 
ing 
 members, and by 
applying more focused pressure than the U.N.S.C. on non-
emocr
  
 it 
emain at the mercy of 
Chinese and Russian vetoes—the Concert of Democracies, then, 
will have accomplished nothing.56     
                                
III. CONCERT OF DEMOCRACIES 
 The United States, under the leadership of the Truman 
administration, was instrumental in shaping the institutions—t
United Nations, NATO, and others—that together formed th
international security architecture of the 20th century.  N
might consider taking the lead in crafting a new institutio
suited for the demands o 2 st
democrat
A. Role  
 A Concert of Democracies would provide democrat
countries an alternative venue in which to coordinate activities 
and advance their interests.  This would allow democratic 
countries to better address security challenges like terrorism and
the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes like
Iran and North Korea.  It would also help democratic count
promote civil, political, and human rights—both by solidify
those rights among existing and aspiring
d acies that violate those rights.   
 Although the Concert of Democracies could 
theoretically replace the United Nations altogether, most 
advocate beginning with an organization that, at least 
nominally, is situated within the United Nations framework.55
Nonetheless, for the Concert of Democracies to be effective,
will need to have the power to authorize punitive measures.  
Otherwise, democracies will continue to require a U.N.S.C. 
resolution to use force, and will thus r
                 
55 See, e.g., Daalder, supra note 16 (noting that “[t]he Concert o
Democracies is not a substitute for all other forms of multilateral and 
bilateral cooperation, but a complement to them.”); Tod Lindberg, The 
Treaty of the Democratic Peace, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 12, 2007 (arguing 
that the actions of the Concert of Democracies’ membership should remain
“consistent with their other international obligations, including under t
U.N. Charter.”); and Ikenberry, supra note 29, at 25 (arguing that the 
Concert of Democracies should
f 
 
he 
 function “ideally within existing regional 
and global institutions . . . ”).  
56 Two scholars have proposed that the Concert of Democracies 
should be allowed to authorize the use of force “to enforce the purposes of 
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B. Structure 
Under one structure, which would resemble the United 
Nations, the Concert of Democracies would consist of two main 
organs—a larger one, comprising the organization’s full 
membership, and a smaller one that would only contain a select 
portion.  For purposes of efficient decision-making, the smaller 
organ would have responsibility over urgent matters that require 
swift, decisive responses.  Seats in the smaller organ of the 
Concert of Democracies would be allotted on a rotating 
schedule and based on regional representation.  Each region of 
the world would be allotted a certain number of seats.  Members 
from that region would rotate the seats in the smaller organ at 
one-year or two-year intervals and would be tasked, of course, 
with taking into consideration not merely their own interests, 
but the interests of the region they represent.  This system 
would be very much like the rotation system that governs the 
presidency of the European Union.57   
Under a similar proposal, inspired largely by NATO, the 
Concert of Democracies would consist of multiple regional 
councils, which would form the bedrock of the organization.  
The bulk of the organization’s deliberations would occur within 
these regional councils, which would also to a large extent 
oversee implementation of the Concert of Democracies’ 
decisions.  The regional councils would be connected to each 
other via a steering committee, which would coordinate between 
and among the regional councils and make strategic decisions 
on behalf of the Concert of Democracies.  Each regional council 
would be represented on the steering committee by an elected 
representative of that region.   
Both of these proposals have advantages and 
disadvantages.  Through the smaller organ in the one case and 
the Steering Committee in the other, a Concert of Democracies 
would be able to make certain decisions efficiently—without 
having to consult the entire membership.  But this strength is 
also a weakness.  Members holding rotating seats on the smaller 
organ or the Steering Committee may fail to take seriously their 
responsibility to represent not just their own views, but those of 
their regions as well.  This could lead to friction among the 
                                                                                                                                                         
the United Nations in the wake of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression” or in other ways that are “consistent with the purposes 
of the United Nations.”  Ikenberry supra note 29, at 61.   
57 See Fact Sheet on the Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/union_presidency_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
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members in a particular regional group.  This also means
the decisions made by the smaller organ or the Steering 
Committee would carry less weight, since they would contain 
the input of on
 that 
ly a portion of those countries that comprise the 
organization. 
racies 
re 
ong 
 
verning the amount of time 
that can be spent on a given issue. 
C. Membership and Voting 
 
ht to 
                       
A third structure would create a Concert of Democ
that consisted of only one chamber.  This would have the 
advantage of allowing all members to participate in critical 
decisions, which would give the organization’s decisions mo
weight.  It could, however, result in a degree of chaos, with 
matters large and small having to be subjected to debate am
a large number of representatives.  To mitigate the chaotic
dimension of this plan, members might form committees 
empowered to make recommendations to the full membership.  
Members might also adopt rules go
 Under any proposed structure, the nature of the 
membership and the Concert of Democracies’ decision-making 
procedures would differ significantly from those of the United 
Nations.  The membership will consist of democratic regimes, 
meaning those that (a) uphold majority rule through regularly
scheduled free and fair elections, and (b) protect basic rights 
such as freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, the rig
assembly, and property rights.58  Numerous independent 
organizations measure these factors, including Freedom House, 
                          
58 Countries potentially eligible for membership at present include: 
United States of America and Canada (North America); Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay (Central/South America); Andorr
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mal
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom (Europe); Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, South Africa (Africa
Israel, Turkey (Near East/Southeast Asia); Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Kiribati, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Palau, Samoa, South Korea, Taiwan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu (East Asia
 
a, 
 
ta, 
); 
/Pacific).  
This li  st is adapted from a Memorandum by Pratik Chougule on a League of
Democracies Policy Report (Jan. 5, 2009) (on file with author).  
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the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Bank, and others.59
One could easily envision a composite index that takes a
these factors into account in determining elig
  
ll of 
ibility for 
membership in the Concert of Democracies. 
e use of 
 
t are vital to maintaining international peace 
and security.     
D. Advantages of a Concert of Democracies 
 1. Greater Legitimacy 
 two 
de in 
r 
  
 
how decisions are made, and who is making the decisions. 
cies 
pt of 
                       
  With respect to voting, the drastic change is that a 
Concert of Democracies will replace the veto with a majority 
vote.  To be sure, for some decisions—to authorize th
force, for example—the requirement would be for a 
supermajority vote of two-thirds or three-quarters, but no 
country will have the power to unilaterally prevent the use of 
punitive measures, the deployment of peacekeeping troops, or
other actions tha
 Building upon the work of international law theorists 
and political philosophers, Thomas Franck has identified
factors that confer legitimacy on the decisions made by 
international institutions.60  First, the decisions must be ma
accordance with a decision-making process that is widely 
accepted.61  Second, the various actors participating in that 
decision-making process must, at a basic level, have respect fo
each other, meaning there must be some sense of community 
among the various members that make up the organization.62
Put simply, there has to be a general degree of comfort with
 A Concert of Democracies, much more so than the 
U.N.S.C., would meet these criteria of legitimacy.  Democra
universally accept the notion that a popular vote is the most 
legitimate process for making a decision—the whole conce
democratic governance relies on that very premise.  This, 
incidentally, stands in contradistinction to non-democracies, 
which do not accept the premise that a majority vote is the most 
legitimate process for making decisions.  As a result, there was 
                          
59 See, e.g., Freedom in the World Index, Report by Freedom House 
(2008), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2009); Worldwide Governance Indicators, Report by the World 
Bank (2008) available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.   
60 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 38 
(1990). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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always a certain degree of incoherence to the U.N.S.C., where 
non-democratic governments participated in the quintessentially 
democratic process of making decisions by a popular vote.
incoherence would no longer exist in a Concert of Democ
All members of a Concert of Democracies would be fully 
committed, as a matter of principle, to the organization’s 
democrat
  That 
racies.  
ic decision-making process, which, in turn, would 
result in more deeply-felt respect for the outcomes of that 
 
im 
 
r own 
l 
—
y a 
democracies than repudiation by an international organization 
e 
 
                                                
process. 
 A Concert of Democracies would also be a more 
cohesive community in which the views of other members
would be widely respected.  Democracies, on a fundamental 
level, are somewhat skeptical of non-democratic regimes 
because it is never clear whether those regimes can truly “cla
to be speaking for the people of their countries.”63  Countless 
democratic documents express a clear sense that democratic
government is morally superior to other forms of government 
and that democratic governments enjoy greater legitimacy, 
having been endowed with certain powers directly by thei
people.64  Their opinions carry the force of majority sentiment 
in their countries, while the decisions of an autocrat may 
represent little more than the autocrat’s own personal whim.  Al
of this means that for purposes of legitimacy, democratic 
governments care more about what their fellow democracies
their jury of peers, as it were—think than what monarchic or 
autocratic governments think.  An explicit repudiation b
purely democratic body such as the Concert of Democracies 
would, therefore, carry significantly greater weight for 
consisting of various different types of governments.   
 Of course, these arguments leave unaddressed the 
question of how countries that are not members of the Concert 
of Democracies will view the organization’s decisions.  As on
vocal critic of the Concert of Democracies has argued, even if
 
63 Lindberg, supra note 55, at 21. 
64 The U.S. Declaration of Independence holds certain truths to be 
“self-evident,” including that rights to life and liberty are inalienable, and 
that “to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed.”  More recently, the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe affirmed in a statement 
that “the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and 
genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all 
government.”  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE], 
Copenhagen, Den., June 5-July 29, 1990,  Document of the Copenhagen 
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, ¶ 6 (June 
29, 1990). 
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many in the United States and some other parts of the world 
believe that a Concert of Democracies could engage in more 
legitimate decision-making than the U.N.S.C., many in the rest 
of the w
rs 
—but no 
 
ainst the rest—and react 
with even more hostility than it did to the 2003 
s of 
ws 
e.  
 
C. 
t 
 
ainst Iraq, which included sanctions and no-fly 
zones, the Arab world had no representation whatsoever at the 
U.N.S.C
                                                
orld do not: 
Consider [the Concert of Democracies’] 
potential engagement in the Middle East, a 
region that would probably have two membe
in the global body—Israel and Turkey
Arab representatives.  Were the [Concert of 
Democracies] to carry out a military 
intervention in the region, the Arab world would
see it as the West ag
invasion of Iraq.65 
 This raises a valid concern, but upon scrutiny the 
concern is more theoretical than actual.  In practice, member
a Concert of Democracies would still engage in vigorous 
diplomacy to marshal support among non-members for any 
punitive measures.  To stay with the above example, the vie
of Arab governments would be an important part of the Concert 
of Democracies’ decision-making process, in spite of their 
absence from the organization itself.  In that sense, the Concert 
of Democracies would slightly differ from the United Nations.  
In the United Nations, of course, it is the U.N.S.C., and not the 
General Assembly, which makes decisions on the use of forc
The U.N.S.C., which frequently makes decisions that impact the
Arab world, does not have permanent Arab representation—
since no Arab country is a permanent member of the U.N.S.
and the system for rotating members does not assign a sea
specifically to the Arab world.  Indeed, when the U.N.S.C. 
authorized the Gulf War in 1990, the Arab world had no 
meaningful representation at the U.N.S.C. and in subsequent
years, when the United States took various different punitive 
measures ag
.66 
 
65 Charles Kupchan, Minor League, Major Problems, FOREIGN AFF., 
Nov.-Dec. 2008. 
66 See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) 
(authorizing the use of force against Iraq, at which point the only Arab 
representation on the U.N.S.C. was Yemen); S.C. Res 1284, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999) (establishing new verification procedures for 
Iraq, at which point there was no Arab representation on the U.N.S.C.). 
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Moreover, non-members will likely judge the Concert of
Democracies’ actions on the basis of the perceived rightness or
wrongness of the actions themselves or, put differently, on 
whether non-members agree with the Concert of Democra
decisions.  If there is general agreement, for example, that the 
Concert of Democracies is doing the right thing in response to 
human rights violations, there will be little outcry simply 
because it was the Concert of Democracies, and not so
international body, that authorized the action.
 
 
cies’ 
me other 
ly, if 
ert 
opposes a particular set of punitive measures can prevent those 
measur
view 
, 
h many 
ough a veto right.  It is likely, then, 
that countries will prefer the decisions of the Concert of 
s vastly more defensible 
of 
                                                
67  Converse
there is widespread opposition to the substance of the Conc
of Democracies’ actions, then there will be a popular 
backlash—just as there would be a backlash today if the 
U.N.S.C. approves a controversial action.  The difference, 
however, is that under the present system a small minority that 
es altogether through a U.N.S.C. veto.  This means of 
delay will no longer be possible in a Concert of Democracies.    
Finally, even setting aside the question of substantive 
agreement with the decisions of the Concert of Democracies, it 
is entirely possible that non-member countries will in fact 
the decisions of the Concert of Democracies as more legitimate 
than those of the U.N.S.C.  As noted above, it is the U.N.S.C.
not the General Assembly, which currently makes all the 
important decisions on matters of war and peace.  Thoug
countries will not have representation in the U.N.S.C. or the 
Concert of Democracies, the Concert of Democracies will at 
least ensure that each region will at all times have equal 
representation in the smaller organ, and no country will have 
disproportionate power thr
Democracies, given the organization’
structure and procedures. 
 2. Superior Outcomes 
 From the perspective of the United States, a Concert 
Democracies will result in superior outcomes.  Democracies 
generally have similar perspectives on modern threats to 
international peace and security, most notably the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes and terrorism—
 
67 See, e.g., Ivo Daalder & Robert Kagan, The Next Intervention, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2007, at A17 (“There is a difference between force 
used to enlarge one’s territory and force aimed at alleviating a grievous harm 
done to others.  A just cause, a clear strategy for success and a definitive 
threat to ourselves or to others whom we are obliged to protect all lend 
legitimacy to military action.”). 
      
22  
 
in no small part because terrorists and rogue regimes target 
democracies more often than non-democracies.  Indeed
past ten years alone, transnational terrorism has struck in t
United States, Europe, and India, as well as in America’s new
democratic allies, Iraq and Afghanistan.  A Concert of 
Democracies would, therefore, be more inclined than the 
U.N.S.C. to take forceful action in response to these threats.  
This point is not merely theoretical.  Since September 11, 
democracies have proven far more supportive than their non-
democratic counterparts of punitive measures against, amon
others, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea.
, in the 
he 
 
g 
nt about the 
 threat and the best method of resolution.  
Nonetheless, there is far greater agreement among democracies 
 
s to 
ass 
uld 
 
y major 
humanitarian intervention in the past fifty years—including 
eeds in 
ill 
                                                
68  To 
be sure, democracies are not always in full agreeme
magnitude of the
than there is between the democracies and the non-
democracies.69   
 A Concert of Democracies would also result in superior 
outcomes for the international community.  Notwithstanding the
fact that it is in the entire international community’s interest
eliminate terrorism and prevent the spread of weapons of m
destruction to rogue regimes, a Concert of Democracies wo
also accomplish more on issues such as genocide and other 
gross human rights violations.  Democracies have a more 
deeply-rooted commitment to upholding human rights and
assuring that other countries do the same.  Indeed, ever
those in El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo—has been spearheaded by democracies.70      
 If, as expected, a Concert of Democracies succ
addressing challenges to international peace and security, it w
enhance the organization’s standing among members and non-
members alike.  Democracies will appreciate that the 
organization allows them to more efficiently tackle modern 
threats, and will, as a result, become more loyal to the Concert 
of Democracies over time.  Many non-democracies, in turn, will 
 
68 Benard & Leaf, supra note 15. 
69 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 31:  
The enduring ideological conflict since the Enlightenment has not 
been between capitalism and communism but between liberalism and 
autocracy . . . democracies have pursued foreign policies to make the world 
safe for democracy.  And autocracies pursue foreign policies aimed at 
making the world safe, if not for all autocracies, at least for their own 
continued rule . . . .  The competition between [democracies and autocracies] 
has become a defining feature of the international scene. 
70 See, e.g., MEISLER, supra note 5. 
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see the Concert of Democracies’ interventions in humanitarian 
crises and will come to recognize the value that the organization 
provides.  The superior outcomes achieved through a Concert of 
orce the organization’s 
legitimacy.  
most 
 
nds 
y and economic terms.   This 
is hardly the effect an international organization—particularly 
one ded
er, it 
g 
tic 
                                                
Democracies, then, will ultimately reinf
 3. Superior Incentives 
One of the drawbacks of the present international 
security architecture is that it provides states with perverse 
incentives to accumulate power.  As noted in Part II, at the 
founding of the United Nations, the states that wielded the 
power were rewarded with a permanent seat on the U.N.S.C.  
They were also given a veto, and with it a disproportionate 
capacity to shape the course of world events.  The pattern 
continues today, as countries that have become more powerful 
in recent decades—including India, Brazil and Japan—are now
under consideration for permanent seats if the U.N.S.C. expa
its membership.71  The lesson countries learn from this is that if 
they want to be taken seriously and shown respect from their 
peers in the international community, they would do well to 
become more powerful in militar 72
icated to maintaining international peace and security—
should have on state behavior.   
A Concert of Democracies would provide far healthier 
incentives.73  Rather than reward the accumulation of pow
would reward states for steps they take towards establishin
democratic governance.  States that become solidly democra
would be granted membership and an equal voice in the 
organization.  The Concert of Democracies could thereby 
 
71 See UN Security Council Enlargement, supra note 28. 
72 The five permanent members of the U.N.S.C. are also the only 
countries lawfully entitled to possess nuclear weapons under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  See BOLTON, supra note 30, at 250.  Countries will 
either draw from this the lesson that a nuclear arsenal makes permanent 
membership in the U.N.S.C. more likely, or that permanent membership in 
the U.N.S.C. helps confer legitimacy upon a nuclear arsenal.  Neither is a 
healthy lesson to draw.  
73 Some have argued that a Concert of Democracies would create 
incentives for non-democracies to band together in an effort to 
counterbalance the Concert of Democracies.  See, e.g., Kupchan, supra note 
65.  Several scholars have offered powerful rebuttals of this argument.  
Robert Kagan, for example, has said that while some claim a Concert of 
Democracies would increase divisions in the world, “. . . those divisions are 
already there.  The question now is whether there is any way to pursue 
American interests and liberal democratic ends despite them.”  Kagan, supra 
note 31.   
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become a powerful catalyst for the worldwide expansion of 
democracy, much like the European Union catalyzed the 
expansion of democracy on its continent.  Such an expansion of 
democracy would enhance respect for civil and political rights 
orldw mony with the stated U.S. 
national security objectives. 
t 
 
onsult 
ver, the 
f 
, 
ation of the international community 
through collective authorization, in turn, can be extremely 
 
Y 
nd 
nal 
important, therefore, to develop incentives that help overcome 
nstincts and to craft arguments that place a 
  These 
t as 
                                                
w ide, and would also be in har
 4. Collective Authorization 
 Finally, the Concert of Democracies preserves the mos
appealing feature of the present system—the concept of 
collective authorization.  As noted in Part II, some of the reform
proposals would do away with that concept and, for example, 
expand the definition of self-defense to allow countries to use 
force in a larger number of situations without having to c
other members of the international community.  Howe
idea of a body charged with considering the merits of the use o
force is a sensible one.  The use of force by any country 
imposes substantial externalities on the international 
community.  The international community should, therefore
have a voice in the decision-making process leading up to the 
use of force.  The affirm
helpful to the United States, by providing diplomatic cover and
other valuable benefits. 
IV. MAKING THE CONCERT OF DEMOCRACIES A REALIT
 The idea for a Concert of Democracies is ambitious, a
some countries may at first feel reluctant to join.  They may 
think it unnecessary, for example, to commit to a new 
international institution.  Alternatively, they may fear that a 
Concert of Democracies undermines the current internatio
security architecture and violates international law.  It will be 
wait-and-see i
Concert of Democracies within the bounds of international law.   
A. Incentives 
 The most obvious incentive for joining the Concert of 
Democracies would be an economic benefit.  Many of the 
countries eligible for membership in the Concert of 
Democracies are among the world’s poorer countries.74
countries would value economic assistance for developmen
 
74 See supra note 58 for the list of countries. 
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well as to strengthen institutions and the rule of law.  These 
countries would be more likely to join the Concert of 
Democracies if membership were linked to those forms o
economic assistanc
f 
e.  Furthermore, by strengthening democratic 
governance among recipient countries, these benefits would also 
 
s 
sly 
, and 
est by lobbying for permanent seats in 
the U.N.S.C.   The Concert of Democracies would offer a 
 
 
 of 
 
n 
armed attack against one will be considered an armed attack 
e policies might be 
a Concert of Democracies.  
B. Arguments under International Law 
 
s.  
                                                
help to advance one of the chief goals of the Concert of 
Democracies.       
 The Concert of Democracies could also attract members 
by emphasizing that the organization offers the opportunity to 
wield greater influence on the world stage.  Today, important 
democracies like Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan are not able
to provide meaningful input when the U.N.S.C. makes decision
on matters of war and peace.  But these countries are obviou
interested in participating in the decision-making process
have signaled their inter
75
faster, more realistic way for these countries to gain the 
influence they seek.     
 Finally, a Concert of Democracies might consider 
exploring whether to provide trade benefits or security 
guarantees to members.  This is a strategy that has proven
effective for the European Union and NATO.  The European
Union, for example, allows for the generally free movement
goods, services, and capital among all member states.76  
NATO’s charter, meanwhile, contains provisions relating to
economic cooperation, but far more important, says that a
against all.77  Some combination of thes
appropriate in the context of 
 1. U.N. Charter 
 The first option, and the one that is perhaps least 
disruptive, would be to justify the Concert of Democracies 
through the U.N. Charter.  The U.N. Charter, after all, explicitly
endorses human rights, equality, and other democratic value
Advocates of the Concert of Democracies could argue that these 
provisions in the U.N. Charter are entirely compatible with the 
 
75 See UN Security Council Enlargement, supra note 28. 
76 See European Commission, Enterprise and Industry, Single Market 
for Goods, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-
goods/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009). 
77 North Atlantic Treaty art. 4, Apr. 4, 1949.  
      
26  
 
creation of a Concert of Democracies, since the Concert of 
Democracies would help advance the cause of human rights, 
equality, and democratic governance.  Indeed, by this logic, the 
Concert of Democracies would not only be compatible with the 
 
 
in 
ike 
would still require a U.N.S.C. resolution in order to take any 
unitiv rse, would to a large extent 
 if it no 
e 
 
lish 
n 
 
t to 
r the advancement of 
these ends, [the people] have at all times an inalienable and 
 
                                                
U.N. Charter, but it would actually complement and strengthen
it.  
 It is unclear, however, whether this justification alone 
would be sufficient to afford the Concert of Democracies the 
powers it will need under international law in order to function
effectively.  If the Concert of Democracies truly operates with
the existing legal framework of the United Nations—much l
NATO—then, at least in theory, the Concert of Democracies 
p e measures.  This, of cou
defeat the purpose of establishing a Concert of Democracies.    
 2. Right of Revolution 
 A more dramatic option would be to replace the U.N. 
Charter altogether, and the right of revolution may supply a 
rationale for doing so.  The right of revolution is the widely 
recognized principle that a government can be replaced
longer serves the ends for which it was instituted.78  Perhaps th
most elegant expression of that principle appears in the United 
States Declaration of Independence, which states that 
“whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive” of
certain ends, it is “the Right of the People to alter or to abo
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation o
such principles and organizing in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”79  
Expressions of this right can also be found in several state 
constitutions in the United States.  The constitution of New 
Hampshire, for example, states that “whenever the ends of 
government are perverted . . . the people may, and of right ou
reform the old, or establish a new government.”80  Similarly, the 
constitution of Kentucky states that “fo
indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in
such manner as they deem proper.”81   
 
78 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690); 
THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (1791).   
79 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
80 N.H. CONST. art. X.  
81 KY. CONST. pt. 1, § 4.  
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 Advocates of the Concert of Democracies migh
that the principle applies equally in the international context.  
The U.N. Charter was instituted for certain purposes, including 
to effectively manage threats to international peace and security
and to protect human rights, among other things.  The 
U.N.S.C.’s manifest inability to take action in response to the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of terrorism, 
and humanitarian crises, then, arguably constitutes a failure of
the U.N. Charter to achieve the purposes for w
t argue 
 
 
hich it was 
enacted.  The international community may have an argument, 
 U.N. Charter the same 
way that national constitutions
, 
l 
, 
nion 
ed 
                                                
therefore, that it is entitled to replace the
 have been replaced over the 
years when they have proven ineffectual.82    
 3. Customary International Law 
The notion that the U.N.S.C. does not, or should not
possess a monopoly on the authority to authorize punitive 
measures may have already worked its way into internationa
law through state practice.  Since 1946, many states have used 
force without explicit authorization from the U.N.S.C. and 
without an explicit self-defense rationale.83  The United States
for example, instituted a blockade against the Soviet U
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and claimed it was empower
to do so because of an authorization from the Organization of 
American States (OAS).84  More recently, NATO took action 
against Serbia in defense of Kosovo without explicit 
authorization from the U.N.S.C.85  In spite of the absence of 
 
82 The United States Constitution, for example, replaced the Articles 
of Confederation in 1789.  Similarly, the United Nations Charter replaced the 
Covenant of the League of Nations in 1945. 
83 International law scholars disagree on the precise uses of force that 
have violated the Charter, but there is a general consensus that many 
examples of the use of force “have not been authorized by the Security 
Council, and cannot be placed within any reasonable conception of self-
defense.” Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use 
of Military Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 100 (2003) (listing the Soviet action in 
Czechoslovakia (1948); the North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950); 
U.S. actions in Guatemala (1954); the Israeli, French, and British invasion of 
Egypt (1956); the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956); the U.S. sponsored 
Bay of Pigs invasion (1961); the Indian invasion of Goa (1961); the U.S. 
invasion of the Dominican Republic (1965); the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia (1968); the Arab attack on Israel in the Six-Day War (1973); 
North Vietnamese actions against South Vietnam (1960-1975); the 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (1979); the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (1979); and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda (1979)).  
84 Yoo, supra note 44, at 763. 
85 See Javier Solana, NATO’s Success in Kosovo, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-
Dec., 1999.  
      
28  
 
U.N.S.C. authorization in that case, however, NATO’s punitive 
measures against Serbia were widely perceived as legitimate.  
The Kosovo intervention, then, demonstrated that Americans
and Europeans “did not believe international legitimacy resided 
exclusively at the UN Security Council, or in the U.N. Charter, 
 
or even in the traditional principles of international law . . . .”86 
Rather,
 a 
.”87   
er 
 
hould be empowered to 
authorize the use of force.  It could therefore be argued that a 
orize the use of 
t 
f 
 
ely 
onomic, 
having become “a duty owed by all governments to their 
                                
 acting in Kosovo without Security Council approval 
“left the determination of international justice in the hands of
relatively small number of powerful Western [democracies]
These examples could provide a legal justification und
customary international law for authorizing the use of force 
through a Concert of Democracies.  They demonstrate that 
countries can and do make decisions regarding the use of force
outside of the U.N.S.C. framework.  Moreover, they suggest 
that countries already accept the idea that organizations other 
than the U.N.S.C.—the OAS in one case, NATO in the other—
can confer legitimacy upon punitive measures.  A Concert of 
Democracies would encompass a larger number of countries 
than both the OAS and NATO and it would command a more 
coherent set of arguments for why it s
Concert of Democracies, empowered to auth
force, is within the bounds of what has already been established 
under customary international law.   
 4. Right to Democratic Governance 
 Finally, international law scholars have begun to 
recognize the concept of a right to democratic governance.88  
According to these scholars, the right finds its origins in concep
of self-determination.  That concept became a central feature o
the post-World War II order and was enshrined in the U.N. 
Charter.  It was also enshrined in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which states: “All peoples have the 
right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they fre
determine their political status and freely pursue their ec
social and cultural development.”89  As one scholar has noted, 
the concept was thereby “universalized and internationalized,” 
                 
86 ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE 
IN THE ORLD ORDER 127 (2004).    
 Right to Democratic 
Gover
l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.
NEW W
87 Id. 
88 See Thomas Franck, The Emerging
nance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992). 
89 Internationa
N.T.S. 171.  
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peoples and by each government to all members of the 
internationa 90l community.”   Taken together, the provisions in 
the U.N. Charter and the Covenant entitle citizens of all nations 
atic 
nd 
t 
 Political 
rs.”   
 this 
te 
emocracy.”   
Meanwhile, the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
 
ght to 
vernance, thereby affirming the right as explicitly 
as possible.  A Concert of Democracies, then, would constitute 
e institutional culmination of the right to democratic 
governance. 
                                                
to “determine their collective political status through democr
means.”91 
 Complementary provisions concerning the right to a 
democratic electoral process further bolster these provisions 
relating to self-determination.  The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights affirms the right of all persons to participate in 
“periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal a
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalen
free voting procedures.”92  The Covenant on Civil and
Rights states that every citizen has the right “to vote and be 
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electo 93
Several regional organizations have explicitly recognized
right as well.  The OAS Charter requires members to promo
“the effective exercise of representative d 94
obligates signatories to “undertake to hold free elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot.”95   
 Taken together, these concepts and provisions could
form a strong legal foundation for the Concert of Democracies.  
International law has come to recognize the right to democratic
governance and the supreme legitimacy of the democratic 
political system.  Existing international institutions, however, do 
not reflect this development and continue to provide an equal 
forum for governments that do not uphold their obligations 
under the various charters and declarations affirming that right.  
A Concert of Democracies, by contrast, would only provide a 
role in the organization to those states that respect the ri
democratic go
th
 
90 Franck, supra note 88, at 54. 
91 Id. 
92 Universal Declaration of Human Rights , supra note 40. 
93 Id. 
94 Organization of American States Charter ch. II, art. 3(d), June 10, 
1993, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-
41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm.  
95 European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, protocol 1, 
art. 3., available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#P1.Art3.  
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litical transformation in non-democracies.  Over time, the 
mocracies would gain the respect of members and 
non-members alike, and would become the bedrock of 
international security architecture for the 21st century.   
  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The existing collective security apparatus is broken.  T
U.N.S.C. regularly fails to respond effectively to humanit
crises, the threat of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapon
of mass destruction.  Reform proposals are in some cases 
n general they would either fail to address the appealing, but i
underlying deficiencies of the current system, or are not 
workable, given the ability of the permanent members o
U.N.S.C. to veto reforms they do not support.   
  
 The United States, together with other democratic 
countries, must spearhead the creation of a Concert of 
Democracies.  Shared values would allow the members of 
Concert of Democracies to cooperate more meaningfully in 
addressing modern threats.  A Concert of Democracies could 
also serve as a catalyst for democratic reform, helping to 
strengthen institutions in nascent democracies and to spu
po
Concert of De
